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Abstract: Log analysis is a method to identify intrusions at the host or network level by scrutinizing the log events
recorded by the operating systems, applications, and devices. Most work contemplates a single type of log for analysis,
leading to an unclear picture of the situation and diﬃculty in deciding the existence of an intrusion. Moreover, most
existing detection methods are knowledge-dependent, i.e. using either the characteristics of an anomaly or the baseline
of normal traﬃc behavior, which limits the detection process to only anomalies based on the acquired knowledge. To
discover a wide range of anomalies by scrutinizing various logs, this paper presents a new unsupervised framework,
UHAD, which uses a two-step strategy to cluster the log events and then uses a filtering threshold to reduce the volume
of events for analysis. The events from heterogeneous logs are assembled together into a common format and are analyzed
based on their features to identify anomalies. Clustering accuracy of K-means, expectation-maximization, and farthest
first were compared and the impact of clustering was captured in all the subsequent phases. Even though log events
pass through several phases in UHAD before being concluded as anomalous, experiments have shown that the selection
of the clustering algorithm and the filtering threshold significantly influences the decision. The framework detected the
majority of anomalies by relating the events from heterogeneous logs. Specifically, the usage of K-means and expectationmaximization supported the framework to detect an average of 87.26% and 85.24% anomalous events respectively with
various subsets.
Key words: Unsupervised anomaly detection, heterogeneous log, feature analysis, filtering threshold, generic format
log

1. Introduction
An intrusion detection system (IDS) examines computer systems for intrusive activities that violate the established security model [1]. Signature-based detection detects only known attacks based on recognized patterns,
whereas anomaly-based detection is able to detect unknown attacks, i.e. traﬃc that diﬀers from the baseline
(normal) behavior, but it suﬀers from a high false alarm rate. Most unsupervised anomaly detectors use clustering, an unsupervised learning algorithm [1,2–7] that finds instances in an unlabeled dataset with strange
properties or models with unforeseen behaviors.
Examining a single type of log results in more false positives and false negatives, whereas correlating events
from several logs facilitates in exposing most attacks [8]. Every computer network environment is distinctive
and has various prospective data sources for security investigation [9]. Therefore, the ability of an anomaly
detector to handle multiple log sources will help to detect a wide range of intrusions.
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As we use multiple logs for anomaly detection, it is impractical to learn and maintain a precise and upto-date traﬃc profile for every such log. Moreover, most approaches available today are knowledge-based, i.e.
using signatures or learned traﬃc models, which restricts the detector to only known anomalies. To overcome
these limitations, the process of anomaly detection should be devised in such a way that it must be able to
detect intrusions from fresh data by learning from it, rather than building a model to detect intrusions in the
future traﬃc data.
To address these problems, we propose a new unsupervised anomaly detection framework called UHAD,
which scrutinizes heterogeneous logs without using a trained model on traﬃc behavior or the knowledge of the
anomalies, and uses a two-step strategy in clustering to segregate normal and abnormal events. A new algorithm
for filtering is introduced, whereby the filtering threshold is calculated based on the volume of log events and
the number of log event clusters. To collect the events from multiple logs into a common setup, we frame a
generic format comprising important features that are discriminating in detecting anomalies. New algorithms
are introduced to analyze the events to discover anomalous events.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, we introduce related work on unsupervised
anomaly detection methods using clustering and also highlight the variations of our framework from the others.
Section 3 describes the components of UHAD and the metrics used to measure the performance of these
components. The results produced by the framework components are discussed in Section 4. Finally, conclusions
and future work are presented in Section 5.
2. Related work
The importance of using multiple logs for intrusion detection was introduced and emphasized by Abad et al.
[8]. They correlated system calls with network logs to detect a specific anomaly, i.e. the Yaha virus. Synthetic
data were used to train and test the model. Detection accuracy increased with log correlation, but the “predict
the next system call” method underperformed for this problem. UCLog [10], a unified logging architecture,
correlates events from various logs for intrusion detection and was further extended as UCLog+ [9], a security
data management system to correlate raw data, alerts, and incidents. Alerts and incidents were stored in a
centralized database and were queried to perform security analysis, which was then related to raw logs stored
at a remote location. Correlations were focused on timestamps and host IP addresses to present the perspective
of attack trends on the network. These works on correlating logs inspired us to use multiple logs for anomaly
detection.
An unsupervised anomaly detection model (training and testing) [6] compared five clustering algorithms
to select the best based on detection accuracy. Even though this model resulted in higher accuracy in detecting
unknown intrusions than the signature-based detection model, it was not feasible for real-time detection due
to the high false positives. This is the common limitation in using trained models when testing with fresh
data. To overcome this limitation, we use clustering algorithms only to group the log events that need to be
examined for detecting anomalies. This also avoids the need of having two diﬀerent datasets for training and
testing. An unsupervised anomaly detection method [11] consisting of three steps in the training phase, namely
filtering, clustering, and modeling, initially filters out the attack data to retain normal data for clustering, and
the clusters generated were modeled using a one-class SVM to form a hypersphere. The data points that fell
inside the hypersphere were considered as normal. In the testing phase, those data points in the test data that
fell outside this hypersphere were concluded as an attack. Although clustering and filtering are used in UHAD,
it diﬀers from [11] in the order in which these functions are applied to the log data and the strategy followed
in implementing these functions. Unlike [11], all the events in a particular log are used for clustering to enable
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filtering to identify the sparse clusters to be filtered in for further processing. Therefore, no models were built
to classify fresh data and no adjustments were made to the amount of attack events available in the logs.
A fully unsupervised attack detection approach was proposed by Casas et al. [7] that uses parallel
multiclustering uniting the concept of density-based clustering, subspace clustering, and evidence accumulation
(SSC-EA) to overcome common clustering problems. The performance of the method was measured by
computational time, which increases when the number of features in the events clustered increases. This
approach detects network attacks without relying on labeled data or training, and our framework also has
a similar knowledge-independent approach to detect successful and unsuccessful intrusions. In our case, the
existing iterative clustering methods, i.e. K-means, expectation-maximization (EM), and farthest first (FF),
were tested with diﬀerent parametric settings to recognize their appropriateness in terms of accuracy in grouping
log events. The clustering problems were handled by calculating the initialization parameters based on log events
clustered and the suitability of the parameters was tested with diﬀerent settings to evaluate the accuracy in
producing better clusters. Unlike [7,11], clustering was used twice at diﬀerent points in UHAD to classify the
events: 1) to assist the filterer to identify the abnormal events and 2) to support the analysis method in detecting
anomalies.
The clustering and filtering strategies used in UHAD were initially proposed in [12], but they are
implemented diﬀerently in UHAD. The first step in the clustering strategy is similar to that of [12], but in
the second step, the logs are clustered only once in UHAD since the volume of events that changes clusters
in successive iterations is considerably less with inconsequential detection. Instead, the logs are clustered with
various initial parameters in order to evaluate the role of seed and K in forming precise clusters. The filtering
rules formulated in [12] were refined in UHAD to adapt to the changes made in clustering and also to avoid
hardcoding the filtering threshold. Therefore, the filtering threshold was automatically calculated from the
clustered events in UHAD. As we think that clustering alone cannot serve as a solution for anomaly detection,
several functions have been proposed in UHAD to analyze the clustered events as detailed in Section 3.

3. UHAD
The goal of the framework is to discover anomalous events from heterogeneous logs by identifying the relationships between them, without knowing the characteristics of the anomaly or the model of network traﬃc
behavior. It primarily relies on the pattern of log events and its features to detect anomalies, making it applicable to the evolving network traﬃc environment. We made two assumptions about the datasets used, which
are: 1) the dataset received from the logging sources has recorded every action and is free from modification(s)
or fabrication(s) by the adversary, and 2) the majority of the recorded events in logs are normal traﬃc with a
minority percentage of malicious traﬃc.
We used Scan of the Month #34 (SOTM#34; http://old.honeynet.org/scans/scan34/) from the Honeynet project, which has been analyzed and validated by multiple contestants (http://old.honeynet.org/scans
/scan34/sols/3/sotm, http://old.honeynet.org/scans/scan34/sols/2/proc.pdf, http://www.honeynet.org/scans/
scan34/sols/1/index.html) of the challenge, and also examined in [13,14]. The dataset includes evidence from
several logs, i.e. Apache Server, Linux syslogs, Snort NIDS, and iptables firewall, which were recorded by different sources in a Honeynet system. To achieve better confidence of the framework in identifying anomalies,
four subsets covering diﬀerent durations were tested, which exhibit diﬀerent anomalies.
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3.1. Log preprocessing
A custom written parser was used to extract the data from the logs, which is incorporated with additional
functions, i.e. Isolator and Timestamp Synchronizer. To facilitate further processing, the isolator separated the
events of the iptables firewall log according to connections (TCP, UDP, and ICMP) in separate files, since the
number of features in the events of this log was not even. The Apache server and Linux syslog events diﬀered
by 287 min against the iptables firewall log [14] and therefore the synchronizer adjusted the Apache server logs
and Linux syslogs for the diﬀerence towards the iptables firewall log. After synchronizing the time, some of
the log events were moved to the respective subsets to match the time duration covered by each subset. The
preprocessed logs were maintained in comma-separated values (CSV) files. Feature selection [15] was used to
eliminate insignificant features and boost the precision in predicting and classifying abnormal events, and so
Weka’s [16] CfsSubsetEval and BestFirst search method was used to implement this step. Feature selection was
performed by setting every feature in the log as class attributes to know the relationship of the set feature with
other features, which will assist in precisely identifying the important features. The features selected from each
log used for further processing are provided in Table 1.
Table 1. Features selected by CfsSubsetEval.

Log type
Access
Error
SSL Error
TCP
UDP
ICMP
Message
Mail
Security
Snort IDS

Selected features
Date, Time, IPClient, ClientRequestLine, StatusCode, ObjectSize, Agent
Date, Time, Severity, ClientIP, Msg
Date, Time, Severity, Msg
Date, Time, Direction, PHYSIN, PHYSOUT, LEN, TOS, PREC, TTL, ID,
DF, SPT, DPT, WINDOW, RES, STATUS, URGP, SRC, DST
Date, Time, Direction, PHYSIN, PHYSOUT, LEN, TOS, PREC, TTL, ID,
DF, SPT, DPT, LEN, SRC, DST
Date, Time, LEN, TOS, PREC, TTL, ID, DF, id, seq, SRC, DST
Date, Time, Daemon, PID, Operation, User, Tty, UID, EUID, Remotehost,
Systemmessage
Date, Time, From, To, Daemon, Mailer, Stat, Priority, Protocol, Message ID,
Relay, Control address, DSN, Queue ID, Messages queued, Messages delivered,
Bytes queued, Bytes delivered
Date, Time, Daemon, PID, Operation, User, Source, Systemmessage
Date, Time, Rulenumber, Rule, Classification, Priority, Protocol, SourceIP,
Sourceport, DestinationIP, Destinationport

Keeping the information in one universal format by bringing all events in diverse logs together facilitates
the analysis process in identifying most of the anomalies. However, including every feature in the logs will
increase the schema size, making it diﬃcult to manage. To analyze the events collectively, a generic format
(GF) was framed with common and important features that were available in the logs, which were also used
in [17–20], i.e. timestamp, source IP, destination IP, source port, destination port, and protocol. Additionally,
Message was also included in the GF as it expresses the action performed by the event and the patterns were
entirely diﬀerent for benign and malignant events. The framed GF specifies the features not only for GFL but
also the features from various logs that can fit into it. The GFL features and the corresponding features chosen
from various logs that fit in GFL are tabulated in Table 2. The reader should note that the selection of features
for GFL and the relevant features picked from various logs was based on the logs considered and it may vary
with diﬀerent logs.

1120

HAJAMYDEEN et al./Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci

Table 2. GFL features.
Generic
format (GF)
Access
Error
SSL Error
TCP
UDP
ICMP
Message
Mail
Security
Snort IDS

Date

Time

Date
Date
Date
Date
Date
Date
Date
Date
Date

Time
Time
Time
Time
Time
Time
time
time
time

Date

time

Source
IP
IP client
Client IP

Destination
IP

SRC
SRC
SRC

DST
DST
DST

Remote host
Source
Source
IP

Destination
IP

Source
Port

SPT
SPT

Port
Source
port

Destination
Port

DPT
DPT

Protocol

Protocol
Protocol
Protocol

Message
Client Request Line
Msg
Msg
STATUS

System message
System message
Destination
port

Protocol

Rule

3.2. Architecture of UHAD
UHAD consists of several cooperating components to identify anomalies. Figures 1a and 1b depict the framework: Figure 1a shows the flow of the process before framing the generic format log (GFL), and Figure 1b
demonstrates the procedure of detecting anomalous events based on GFL. Only Component (1) in Figure 1a
and Component (5) in Figure 1b use existing algorithms available in Weka, while the other components are
newly proposed algorithms written in Perl.
UHAD defines a configuration C that considers logs from several sources S :
C = { S1 , S2 , . . . , Sm }.

(1)

Si = { Li1 , Li2 , . . . , Lin } , i ∈ [1, m],

(2)

Each log source provides one or more logs:

where i specifies the source a particular log belongs to.
Every log event (e) in Lij is extracted to a set of events Eij, and every individual event in Eij is denoted
by eijo :
Lij → Eij = { eij1 , eij2 , . . . , eijo } , i ∈ [1, m] , j [1, n],

(3)

where i and j indicate the source and log that an event belongs to, and each eij is composed of a series of
features F.
Eij or eij = { Fij1 , Fij2 , . . . , Fijp } , i ∈ [1, m] , j [1, n]

(4)

Every log ( Eij ) is subject to feature selection and the resulting features are denoted by:
Eij or eij = { fij1 , fij2 , . . . , fijp } , i ∈ [1, m] , j [1, n].

(5)

Log events Eij can be grouped into a specific number of clusters Kij , and the actual number of clusters formed
is specified by kij :
′
Eij
= { Ek ij1 , Ek ij2 , . . . , Ek ijn },

(6)

where kijn refers to the number of events in cluster n and Ek ijn is used to specify a set of events belonging to
a particular cluster n .
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Ei1

Ei2

Ein

(1) Cluster Events

(1) Cluster Events

(1) Cluster Events

E i1’

E i2’

(2) Filter Clusters

E ij’

(2) Filter Clusters

Ei1*

(2) Filter Clusters

Ei2*

(3) Aggregate
Filtered-In Events

Eij*
(3) Aggregate
Filtered-In Events

(3) Aggregate
Filtered-In Events

Ei1**

Eij**

Ei2**
(4) Transfer Events to
Generic Format
GFE
Generic Format Log
(GFL)
(a)

Generic Format
Log (GFL)
GFE
(5) Cluster Events
GFE’

(6) Analyze
IP Address

(6) Analyze
Port Number

IPAE

PAE

(7) Consolidate Anomalous events
AE
Anomalous Events
(b)

Figure 1. a) UHAD - Event reduction and integration. b) UHAD - Anomaly detection from GFL.

′
∗
∗∗
Eij
: set of clustered events, Eij
: set of filtered events, and Eij
: set of aggregated events.

We define a GFL consisting of a set of events referred to as generic format events (GFE) with specific
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∗∗
features extracted from Eij
.

{
}
GF L → GF E ← E11∗∗ , E12∗∗ , . . . , Eij∗∗ , i ∈ [1, m] , j ∈ [1, n]

(7)

GFE consists of a set of events, where GF eq represents every single event in GFE.
GF E = { GF e1 , GF e2 , . . . , GF eq } or GF eq ∈ GF E

(8)

GFe q is composed of eight principal features:
GF eq = { fda fti , fsip , fdip , fsp , fdp , fpr , fme },

(9)

where fda , fti , fsip , fdip , fsp , fdp , fpr , and fme refer to date, time, source ip, destination ip, source port,
destination port, protocol, and message, respectively. GFE can be grouped into a specific number of clusters
Kg , and the actual number of clusters formed is specified by kg .
GF E ′ = { GF Ek 1 GF Ek 2 , ..., GF Ek n },

(10)

where kn refers to the number of events in cluster n, GFEk n is used to specify a set of events belonging to a
particular cluster n , and GFE’ represents all the clustered events.
The set of anomalous events identified by IP Address Analysis (IPAE) is composed of several events and
is defined as:
IP AE = {IP Ae1 IP Ae2 , . . . , IP Aex },
(11)
where IPAe x refers to individual events in IPAE.
The set of anomalous events identified by port analysis (PAE) is composed of several events and is defined
as:
P AE = {P Ae1 P Ae2 , . . . , P Aey },

(12)

where PAe y refers to individual events in PAE.
The set of anomalous events in IPAE and PAE is consolidated to produce a set of anomalous events
(AE ), and is composed of several events defined as:
AE = {Ae1 Ae2 , . . . , Aez },

(13)

where Ae z refers to individual events in AE.
3.3. UHAD components
The implementation of individual components (as labeled in Figures 1a and 1b) of the anomaly detection
framework is detailed as follows.
3.3.1. Clustering events [Component (1)]
This process separates abnormal events from the normal ones for various logs. In our case, the normal events
must be identified and reduced prior to analysis to decrease processing overhead. The clustering algorithms used
require the number of clusters (K) to group the events. As we are using multiple logs, clustering every log with
diﬀerent clusters (K) to choose the best cluster is time-consuming. Since we want to separate diﬀerent event
patterns in separate clusters, K was calculated based on the patterns in the log. An arrangement consisting of
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two steps was used for clustering which are: 1) predicting the best number of clusters (Kij ) for the given Eij ,
and 2) clustering Eij using the manipulated Kij [12]. Applying the clustering algorithm separately for diﬀerent
services improves the detection quality [5], and therefore every single log was treated separately for this step.
EM clustering [21] has the ability to find the ideal number of clusters [16] using cross-validation, and
therefore EM was used to predict the best number of clusters in step 1, as every cluster relates to a pattern.
Apart from that, EM can also cluster when the number of clusters (K) is provided. There are many clustering
algorithms and every algorithm produces clusters diﬀerently for the same dataset, making it hard to decide an
appropriate algorithm for a particular context. K-means [22] treats all features equally [23] and FF [24] is a
fast, simple, approximate [16], hierarchical, and distance-based clustering using a distance measurement similar
to K-means [25]. The calculation of cluster centroids in successive iterations by FF is opposite to K-means, and
hence we chose to test both in this step. Even though EM is slower in clustering compared to K-means and FF,
it was opted to test its clustering accuracy. Detail descriptions of these algorithms are available in [21,22,24].
To assess the accuracy of clustering algorithms in grouping events, the Weka implementation of K-means, EM,
and FF were used.
Clustering algorithms use K in forming the number of clusters and seed value to decide initial cluster
centers. Even the same algorithm generates diﬀerent clusters with diﬀerent parameter initializations, which led
to diﬃculty in choosing the appropriate parameters. To capture the impact of K and seed in clustering, the
algorithms were tested with four diﬀerent parameter settings. The default seed value of K-means, EM, and FF
are 10, 100, and 1, respectively. The settings used are as follows:
Setting-1 (S1): K ij from step 1 of the clustering strategy with the default seed of the respective
clustering algorithm.
Setting-2 (S2): K ij from step 1 of the clustering strategy with the seed value set to the number of
events in the log ( Lij ).
Setting-3 (S3): Doubling up K ij from step 1 of the clustering strategy with the default seed of the
respective clustering algorithm.
Setting-4 (S4): Doubling up K ij from step 1 of the clustering strategy with the seed value set to the
number of events in the log (Lij ).
The quality of clusters produced by these algorithms with the respective parameter settings was calculated
using the Weka Experimenter with 10-fold cross-validation and 10 iterations to allow every part of the log to be
tested. True positives (TP), true negatives (TN), false positives (FP), and false negatives (FN) were measured
to calculate the accuracy and false positive rate (FPR) of clustering, i.e. Accuracy = (TP + TN) / (FP + FN
+ TP + TN), FPR = FP / (FP + TN). Apart from that, the clusters generated were examined to evaluate the
precision of the algorithms in separating abnormal events.
3.3.2. Filtering clustered events [Component (2)]
The goal of this step is to remove the normal events (noise) while retaining the abnormal events for further
processing. The threshold ( Et ) for identifying sparse clusters was calculated based on the number of events
and clusters for a particular log, i.e. E t = E ij / k ij . Hence, the characteristics of anomalies were not required
for filtering events. The entire step was automated using a script written in Perl that receives a clustered file
in ARFF format as input and produces the filtered-in events in CSV format. The performance of this step was
evaluated by the number of events reduced and the number of abnormal events retained for further processing.
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3.3.3. Aggregating filtered-in events [Component (3)]
This component combines the redundant events, thereby reducing the events in the filtered log. Aggregation
merges redundant records into a single record [26]. A set of two or more events was combined if all the features in
the events were exactly similar to the following event(s), and the aggregated event serves as the representative.
Although much work used sampling methods for data reduction, it was noted by Tavallaee et al. [27] that
sampling methods in anomaly detection introduce a significant bias that degrades the performance. Hence, we
chose aggregating instead of data reduction.
3.3.4. Transferring events [Component (4)]
The purpose of this step is to extract the features from various aggregated logs as stated in GF to store in GFL.
Unavailability of a particular feature in a log was buﬀered with a hyphen (-) during the transfer. The events
in Apache server, Linux syslog, and Snort IDS logs were transferred to GFL, excluding Apache SSL Error and
Linux mail log, since many of the GFL features were not available in these logs, but they were maintained
separately to be used in the analysis. As the iptables firewall log was also used only during analysis, these
events were stored separately as per the features specified in GF.
3.3.5. Clustering GFE [Component (5)]
Even though the logs were clustered and filtered before, there are chances of having less number of normal or
insignificant events due to the inaccuracy in clustering and the subsequent retention by the filtering threshold.
To discover such events and also to find the relationship between the events in GFL, which contains events from
various logs, GFE was reclustered. The GFE was clustered using the same two-step strategy, algorithms, and
parameter settings used previously for the individual logs and the clustered events (GFE’) were stored in ARFF
format. The accuracy of clustering was evaluated using the same metrics used before.
3.3.6. Detecting anomalous events by analyzing features [Component (6)]
The clustered events of GFL was analyzed based on features to detect anomalies. We performed two types of
analysis: IP address analysis and port number analysis.
IP address analysis identifies the relation between the IP address of the events from various logs to
discover the presence of intrusive events in multiple logs. Therefore, the IP address existing in Linux and
Apache events that also existed in Snort IDS events was identified. Not every IP address in Apache and Linux
log has a match with the Snort IDS log, because some of the abnormal activities may have been overlooked
by Snort IDS, but the anomalous patterns must have joined together in the same cluster during clustering.
Therefore, to cover those abnormal activities that were missed by the Snort IDS log, all events in those clusters
to which the identified IP address belonged to were extracted and considered as anomalous. During the analysis
process three features were manipulated: IP address ( fsip ), destination IP address ( fdip ), and cluster number
(fk ). Although checking the IP address of the events was the focus, the cluster number of these events was also
manipulated to get an overall picture of the events related to intrusions. The analysis results were evaluated
based on the volume of anomalous events identified. Additionally, it was compared with the results of the
SOTM#34 challenge to substantiate the coverage of anomalies by UHAD.
Port number analysis identifies anomalous events based on port numbers. This was not an alternative
to IP address analysis, but was rather done to capture those anomalous events that were available in those
clusters that were not captured by it. Most anomalous activities were launched from a host by utilizing the
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unassigned and dynamic ports, since no predetermined service was running on these ports. In the case of inbound
connections the source port number of the events was checked against the listing of the dynamic and unassigned
port numbers as per the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA; http://www.ietf.org/assignments/portnumbers). Subsequently, the destination ports of the matching events were checked for the availability of
well-known port numbers like 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, and 80 to generate an anomalous event list, as intrusive events
mostly succeed through these ports on the victim host. On the other hand, for outbound connections, the
destination port number of the events was checked against the listing of the dynamic and unassigned port
numbers as per IANA and all the matching events were deemed as anomalous. The same set of GFL events
(GFE’ ) used for IP address analysis was also used for port analysis. Naturally, events without port numbers
will be automatically excluded from analysis. The anomalous events detected were evaluated with the same
metrics used for IP address analysis.
3.3.7. Consolidating anomalous events [Component (7)]
This step consolidates the anomalous events to serve as the output of the framework by performing three
operations, namely combining, correlating, and concentrating the events. Some of the events identified during
IP analysis may also have been identified during port analysis. Therefore, these events were compared to
distinguish them and distinct events were brought together for correlation. To recognize the relation between
the events of the Linux syslog, Apache logs, and Snort IDS log with the iptables firewall log, the IP address (fsip
and fdip , excluding internal IPs) of these events was compared with the iptables firewall log and the matching
events were extracted and appended with the previously combined events. To concentrate on the most critical
anomalous events, less significant events were eliminated using a threshold (A t ) on the occurrence of events
related to an IP address. Those events containing IPs that appear A t times or more were extracted to serve as
the result of the framework. The performance of this step was evaluated by the retention of the most critical
anomalous events with the usage of threshold.
4. Results and discussion
To evaluate the capacity of the framework in detecting anomalies, we extracted and combined the events from
various sources, and a total of four subsets were tested. The performance of the framework in detecting various
anomalies was evaluated based on the challenge results of SOTM#34 provided at Honeynet.org.
4.1. Clustered events
EM clustering was applied with the default values for the parameters (i.e. seed = 100, K = –1) on the selected
features of the individual logs (Eij ) to estimate the best number of clusters (Kij ). For example, when predicting
the number of clusters for the Apache Access log, EM initially selects eight clusters by cross-validation but ends
up forming only five clusters (0, 1, 2, 6, 7). Thus, the ideal number of clusters chosen for this log was five, and
the same strategy was followed for all the logs in calculating the ideal number of clusters. The cluster generated
by the EM reveals that the number of clusters generated was not influenced by the number of features and events
in a log, but rather by the patterns of the events. The time taken to predict the ideal number of clusters by EM
for each log varied from seconds to minutes depending on the number of features and volume of events. Using
the clusters (Kij ) manipulated, the logs were clustered and the clustered events (Eij ′ ) with diﬀerent parameter
settings were evaluated. The accuracy and FPR of the algorithms for the respective parameter settings is
illustrated in Figure 2. The clustering strategy implemented showed accuracy of greater than 80% and FPR of
1126

HAJAMYDEEN et al./Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci

less than 20% for all the log subsets clustered. Due to space constraints, we discuss the results of Apache access
for subset-1 in this phase. FF and K-means always return the same number of clusters as requested, whereas
EM produces fewer clusters than requested when there are insuﬃcient distinct patterns in the log. Because of
this nature, EM produced clusters separating the normal and abnormal events resulting in better accuracy for
all parameter settings, but then it fails to clearly separate anomalous events from the others. Even though FF
has a lower accuracy compared to EM, it produced better clusters.
Apache Access Log
100.00
90.00
80.00
70.00
60.00
50.00
40.00
30.00
20.00
10.00
0.00

Detection rate (%)

Accuracy KAccuracy EM means
Accuracy FF
FPR K-means
FPR EM
FPR FF
S1

S2

S3

S4

Figure 2. Clustering accuracy and FPR with diﬀerent parameter settings (Access Log).

The clusters generated by the algorithms for various settings were verified to substantiate the ability of
the algorithm in classifying the abnormal events in separate clusters. In the Apache Access log, there were 16
successful intrusive events and 42 unsuccessful events. Within the context of our research, both were considered
as anomalies. The Apache Access log, consisting of 256 events clustered using FF with K = 5 and the default
seed = 1 (Setting-1), resulted in Clusters 0 to 4 consisting of 189, 3, 48, 13, and 3 events, respectively. FF
managed to group the successful intrusive events in smaller clusters 1 and 3. Out of the 42 unsuccessful intrusive
events 33 were grouped together with other events in Cluster 0, i.e. the biggest cluster, and nine events in a
smaller cluster, i.e. Cluster 2.
The same log when tested with parameter setting-2 also yielded similar clusters as setting-1, showing the
insensitiveness of FF towards the increase in seed value. Settings 3 and 4 also resulted in similar clusters of
successful intrusive events, but then the increase in K had an impact in the formation of clusters, especially
in grouping normal and unsuccessful intrusive events. All the 42 unsuccessful intrusive events were precisely
grouped in a separate cluster, i.e. Cluster 5. EM grouped all the 16 successful intrusive events together in
a smaller cluster, i.e. Cluster 2 for setting-1, Cluster 1 for setting-3, and Cluster 5 for setting-4. This shows
the precision of EM in grouping successful intrusive events in separate clusters. However, for setting-2, the
successful intrusive events were grouped into two clusters, i.e. 15 events in Cluster 2 and 1 event in Cluster 3,
together with other events in both clusters. The majority of the unsuccessful events were assembled in smaller
clusters together with other events for settings 1 and 2, whereas for settings 3 and 4, they were grouped in
separate clusters. There was a significant eﬀect on the formation of clusters when seed and K values were
increased. K-means grouped only two of the successful intrusive events in smaller clusters for setting-1 and all
the 16 events for setting-2, but together with other events. For setting-3, K-means grouped only three of the
successful intrusive events in the smaller cluster and another 13 events in the biggest cluster, i.e. Cluster 0, but
with setting-4, all the successful intrusive events were grouped into two separate clusters, i.e. Clusters 2 and
3. All 42 unsuccessful intrusive events were grouped in small clusters together with other events for settings 1
and 2, but in a separate cluster for settings 3 and 4. This shows the sensitive nature of K-means to K and seed
values in the formation of clusters. The results show that FF performed well in correctly classifying successful
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intrusive events in separate clusters, whereas EM maintained a balance between classifying both successful and
unsuccessful intrusions in appropriate clusters. EM achieved the maximum accuracy with settings 2 and 4 for
most of the logs in this subset, which indicates the impact of seed values in forming better clusters. With all
the four subsets tested, EM accurately clustered most of the individual logs with a minimum number of FP and
FN.
4.2. Filtered events
In this phase, the clustered logs were scanned to identify the number of events and clusters to calculate the
threshold, and the events were filtered accordingly. For the Apache error log clustered using FF with setting-1,
there were 433 events in seven clusters (104, 45, 32, 9, 67, 41, 135). The threshold calculated was 62 (E t =
433 / 7), and there were four clusters satisfying the threshold that retained 127 events while eliminating 306
events. The volume of events filtered out depends on the number of clusters and its size. The use of a threshold
managed to filter out an average of 65% events, while retaining an average of 35% events for further scrutiny
with all the four subsets tested. Out of 209 intrusive events available in the Apache Error log, 32 events were
successful while 177 were unsuccessful. All the successful intrusive events were filtered in by all the algorithms
for the majority of the settings. Most or all unsuccessful intrusions were filtered out because of the high number
of such events having similar patterns recorded in this log; it resulted in forming bigger clusters that did not
satisfy the threshold. The percentages of anomalies retained by the algorithms with the respective settings
are illustrated in Figure 3. Filtering events using the calculated threshold managed to retain all the successful
intrusive events, but failed to retain the majority of unsuccessful intrusions as the volume of such events was
high. This is the limitation of using a calculated threshold (Et ) to filter the log events.

% of intrusive events retained

Apache Error Log
100.00
80.00
Successful

60.00

Unsuccessful

40.00
20.00
0.00
S1 S2 S3 S4 S1 S2 S3 S4 S1 S2 S3 S4
K -means

EM

FF

Figure 3. Retention of anomalies after filtering (Error Log).

4.3. Aggregated events
Since all the intrusive events filtered in were distinctive, aggregation did not remove any of these events. Less
numbers of filtered-in events were reduced in logs, but further processing was not aﬀected by this reduction.
Apache access and error log were trimmed to an average of 12.75%, whereas it was an average of 2% in Linux
syslog. Nearly 75% of the filtered-in events were reduced in the SSL Error log because of similar event patterns
recorded in this log with the same timestamp. Aggregation reduced an average of 20% filtered-in events in the
Snort IDS log. A similar percentage of reduction was achieved by aggregation with the other three subsets as
well. All the events that were retained by the respective logs after it had been filtered and aggregated were
abnormal events of some kind.
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4.4. Transferred events to the framed GFL
Even though all the logs with the stated features in GFL were used for analysis to detect intrusions, only
certain logs were transferred to GFL format to be used in the clustering phase. Apache and Linux events were
captured directly by the victim system and every abnormal activity expressed by Apache server logs and Linux
syslog should have generated events in the Snort IDS log, as it has been designed to capture such activities.
These events were transferred to GFL. Since the events of the Apache SSL Error log and Linux mail log did
not have IP addresses and port numbers, these events were not transferred. However, the respective features of
the excluded logs were maintained separately to be used in the analysis phase.
4.5. Clustered GFL events
The accuracy and FPR of clustering by various algorithms and settings for subset-1 is illustrated in Figure 4.
In spite of the diﬀerences in the nature of events and the absence of values for some features, EM and FF had
a maximum accuracy of greater than 99% and a lowest FPR of 0% with setting-2. This exhibits the impact
of seed value together with ideal clusters (Kg ) in clustering. Despite the number of clusters requested, EM
always clusters based on the available patterns and hence increasing clusters (k) for settings 3 and 4 decreased
the accuracy, but an increase in seed value resulted in higher accuracy. Like EM, the accuracy of FF decreased
with the increase in clusters. As K-means is very sensitive to initializations the accuracy decreased much with
the raise in K and seed. FF achieved the maximum accuracy with GFL for most of the settings with all the
four subsets, exposing its capacity in clustering heterogeneous log events despite the absence of values for some
of the features.

Detection rate (%)

GFL - Subset 1
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90.00
80.00
70.00
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10.00
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S2
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Figure 4. Clustering accuracy and FPR of GFL.

4.6. IP address analysis
IP analysis showed its ability in identifying most anomalous events in the logs and the volume of anomalous
events identified was aﬀected by the formation of clusters in individual logs and GFL. The anomalous events
identified by IP analysis for various algorithms with diﬀerent settings are illustrated in Figure 5. The best
performance was achieved with EM clusters by discovering most of the anomalous events. This was due to the
formation of accurate clusters by EM that were superior to the other algorithms that we tested. In this subset
there were 15 IP addresses from which the anomalous events originated. Out of these 15 IPs, three IPs existed
only in the Snort IDS log and five existed only in Linux syslog, and still the analysis managed to detect the
anomalous events related to these IPs as well. This is because the analysis considers not only the anomalous
events of IPs that exist in multiple log sources but also the events belonging to clusters of these IPs. The
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analysis detected anomalous events from 14 of these IPs with EM clusters. The only IP that was not identified
by the analysis was available only in Linux security log and was filtered out by the threshold (E t ) , making it
unavailable for analysis. A total of 1129 anomalous events from these IPs were detected by analysis with EM
clusters for setting-2, whereas 697 and 331 events were detected with K-means and FF clusters respectively
for setting-1. The better performance with EM clusters with setting-2 also confirms the impact of seed in the
formation of clusters. IP analysis detected the maximum number of anomalous events from diﬀerent IP address
with EM clusters for subsets 1 and 4 and with K-Means clusters for subsets 2 and 3.
4.7. Port number analysis
Only the Snort IDS events in GFE’ were scrutinized, since it contains both source and destination ports. The
volume of anomalous events identified by port analysis is illustrated in Figure 6. Even though the number of
anomalous events identified by port analysis was relatively small, it still managed to retain the anomalous events,
especially the ones related to AWStats vulnerability. A total of 162 anomalous events were detected, which
originated from six diﬀerent IPs in EM clusters with setting-4. This was because of the highest accuracy,
i.e. 99.46%, achieved in clustering Snort IDS logs, thereby enabling the filtering threshold to retain the
events for analysis. Even though the volume of anomalous events detected with FF and K-Means clusters
was less compared to EM clusters, the coverage of anomalies from diﬀerent IPs was more. The anomalous
events originating from seven diﬀerent IPs were detected with FF and K-means clusters for settings 4 and 3,
respectively. A range of 1 to 22 anomalous events that were missed during IP analysis were discovered by port
analysis with K-means and FF clusters. All the events identified by port analysis for EM clusters were already
identified during IP analysis, implying that the accurate cluster formation reduces the need for port analysis.
The majority of the anomalous events from diﬀerent IPs were detected by port analysis with EM clusters for
subsets 1 and 2 and with K-means clusters for subsets 3 and 4.
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Figure 5. Anomalous events of IP analysis.
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Figure 6. Anomalous events of port number analysis.

4.8. Consolidated anomalous events
Application of a threshold to consolidate anomalous events reduced a minimum number of anomalous events
apart from reducing insignificant events. The reduction was minimal with the analysis results of EM and FF
clusters but slightly higher with K-means clusters. The consolidated anomalous events were scrutinized to verify
whether the usage of a threshold eliminated the significant events related to those IPs from which the intrusions
originated. The eﬀect of the threshold in retaining significant anomalous events is presented in Figure 7. A very
small percentage of significant anomalous events was reduced by the threshold, and the increase in the number of
clusters to group the events with settings 3 and 4 had an impact on the percentage of reduction. The percentage
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of anomalous events reduced by the threshold with settings 1 and 2 was less than 2%, whereas it reached a
maximum of 16% with the other two settings. Apart from this, IPs represented by these anomalous events also
gain significance, since they help to understand the actions taken by the intruder. All the 14 IPs detected by
IP analysis with EM clusters for setting-2 from which the intrusion attempt was launched were retained before
the application of the threshold. As the threshold was based on the occurrence of events pertaining to an IP
address, an increase in threshold failed to retain anomalous events from three of these IPs as they were less
than the threshold. Though the usage of a threshold is not viable at this end, it assists in focusing on the most
critical events that need to be immediately addressed.
UHAD detected a wide range of anomalies including Nimda scans, CodeRed worms, SSH Brute Force
scans, CONNECT scans, IRC Traces, and especially the AWStats vulnerability scans through which the
intrusion succeeded. The samples of the anomalous events detected by UHAD that exploit the AWStats
vulnerability are tabulated in Table 3. The percentage of anomalous events detected with various subsets
is presented in Figure 8. The detection performance in using a particular clustering algorithm in UHAD was
not sturdy with diﬀerent subsets. This was influenced by the capacity of a clustering algorithm in handling
varying patterns of events in diﬀerent subsets.
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Figure 7. Impact of threshold in retaining significant
anomalous events.
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Figure 8. Anomalies detected by UHAD.

Due to the lack of availability of the latest datasets containing heterogeneous logs, SOTM#34 was used
to test the capacity of the proposed framework in detecting anomalies. Although this dataset contained more
anomalous events, UHAD managed to detect most of the critical events by discovering the relationship between
the events from various logs. We think that UHAD will be able to detect most of the anomalies even in the
latest traﬃc logs, as the decision is based on the pattern of events and the basic features it contains.

5. Conclusion and future work
We have presented UHAD, a new unsupervised anomaly detection framework to scrutinize logs from heterogeneous sources, without using any knowledge base (signature) or the usual method of training and testing
commonly used in anomaly detectors. The eﬃciency and accuracy of UHAD in identifying intrusions were
examined using three clustering algorithms with four parametric settings and the results were compared with
the work of others using the same dataset. The detected anomalies were parallel with the output of other
methods, hence proving the accuracy of UHAD in detecting anomalies. Among the three algorithms used by
the framework, EM and K-means produced better clusters, assisting the analysis process to detect the majority
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of the anomalies in all the four subsets. The coverage of anomalies with FF clusters were marginally lower than
EM and K-means, but is also applicable for this framework due to its faster clustering even with larger datasets.
All the parameters used in UHAD were calculated based on the tested dataset alone. Hence, the accuracy
of clusters and subsequent retention of anomalies by the threshold were influenced by these parameters. None
of the algorithms showed a consistent accuracy with a particular parameter setting, and the performance of a
particular algorithm was not steady with diﬀerent subsets. Because of this, some of the anomalous events were
filtered out by the threshold, making it unavailable for further investigation. The mechanism of calculating the
clustering parameters and filtering threshold should be refined to improve the precision of anomaly detection and
more clustering algorithms need to be tested to evaluate their applicability for the framework. A recommender
method should be designed to choose the most accurate clusters for a particular log among those generated
by various algorithms with diﬀerent parametric settings. Consequently, these chosen clusters can be used for
further analysis to detect almost all the anomalies.
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